Optimal Stopping Rules of Discrete-Time Callable Financial Commodities with Two Stopping Boundaries

Kimitoshi Sato¹ Katsushige Sawaki¹ Hiroyuki Wakinaga²

¹Graduate School of Business Administration, Nanzan University, 18 Yamazato-cho, Showa-ku, Nagoya 466-8673, Japan
²Osaka Maruni Co., Ltd.

Abstract  In this paper we consider a model of valuing callable financial commodities which enable both an issuer and an investor to exercise their rights, respectively. We show that such a model can be formulated as a coupled stochastic game for the optimal stopping problem with two stopping boundaries. It is also shown that there exist a pair of optimal stopping rules and the value of the stochastic game. Most previous work concerning American options, Israeli options, convertible bonds and callable derivatives have required the specific payoff function when either of the issuer or the investor has exercised their options. However, we deal with rather general payoff functions of the underlying asset price and the time. We also explore some analytical properties of optimal stopping rules of the issuer and the investor. Should the payoff function like call or put options be specified, we are eligible to derive specific stopping boundaries for the issuer and the investor, respectively.

Keywords  Optimal stopping; Game option; Callable securities; Stopping boundaries

1 Introduction

We consider a financial market consisting of a riskless asset and of a risky asset over the discrete time horizon \( t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, T \). Suppose that a new callable contingent claim (hereafter abbreviated by CC) has been issued by the firm into the market. The callable CC enable the seller to cancel by paying an extra penalty to the buyer. On the other hand, the buyer can exercise the right at any time up to the maturity. The game option introduced by Kifer [7] is one of such securities. Callable convertible bonds, liquid yield option notes and callable stock options are examples of such financial derivatives (see [10] and [13]).

In this paper we deal with a valuation model of such callable CC where the payoff functions are more general and different from the payoff if both of the buyer and seller do not exercise their right before the maturity. The decision making related to callable CC consists of the selection of the cancellation time by the seller and the exercise time by the buyer, that is, a pair of two stopping times. When the seller stops at a time before the buyer does, the seller must pay to the buyer more than when the buyer stops before the
seller does. When either of them do not stop before the maturity, then the payoff would
turn out to be intermediate.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a discrete time valuation model
for callable CC whose payoff functions are more general. In section 3 we derive optimal
policies and investigate their analytical properties by using contraction mappings. In
section 4 we discuss a special case of binomial price processes to derive the specific
stop and continue regions. In section 5, concluding remarks are given together with some
directions for the future research.

2 A Genetic Model of Callable-Putable Financial Commodities

We consider the discrete time case where the capital market consists of riskless bond
$B_t$ with interest rate $r_t$ at time $t$, so that
$$B_t = \Pi_{k=1}^t (1 + r_k)B_0$$
(1)

and of a risky asset whose price $S_t$ at time $t$ equals
$$S_t = S_0 \Pi_{k=1}^t (1 + \rho_k) = S_{t-1}(1 + \rho_t)$$
(2)

where $\rho_k(\omega) = \frac{1}{2}(d_k + u_k + \omega_k(u_k - d_k))$, $\omega = (\omega_1, \omega_2, \cdots, \omega_T) \in \Omega = \{1, -1\}^T$ which is
the sample space of finite sequences $\omega$ with the product probability $P = \Pi_{k=1}^T \{p_k, 1 - p_k\}$.

To exclude an arbitrage opportunity as usual, we assume for each
$$-1 < d_k < r_k < u_k, \quad 0 < p_k < 1.$$  (3)

The equivalent martingale probability $P^*$ with respect to $P$ is given by $P^* = \Pi_{k=1}^T \{p_k^*, q_k^*\}$

where
$$p_k^* = \frac{r_k - d_k}{u_k - d_k}, \quad q_k^* = 1 - p_k^*.$$  

It is clear that $E^*(\rho_k) = r_k$ for all $k$.

Given an initial wealth $w_0$, an investment strategy is a sequence of portfolios $\pi = (\pi_1, \pi_2, \cdots, \pi_T)$ at each time where a portfolio $\pi_t$ is a pair of $(\alpha_t, \beta_t)$ with $\alpha_t$ and $\beta_t$
representing the amount of risky asset and of riskless bond at time $t$, respectively. The
wealth formed by the portfolio $\pi$ at time $t$ is given by
$$W_t^{\pi} = \alpha_t S_t + \beta_t B_t, \quad t \geq 1,$$  (4)

with $W_0^{\pi} = w$ given.

An investment strategy $\pi$ is called self-financing if
$$\alpha_t S_0 + \beta_t B_0 = w$$

and
$$S_{t-1}(\alpha_t - \alpha_{t-1}) + B_{t-1}(\beta_t - \beta_{t-1}) = 0, \quad t > 1,$$  

(216) The 9th International Symposium on Operations Research and Its Applications
which means no cash-in and no cash-out from or to the external sources. Let $\hat{W}_t^\pi = B_t^{-1} W_t^\pi$. Then, for a self-financing strategy $\pi$ we have

$$\hat{W}_t^\pi = w_0 + \sum_{k=1}^t B_k^{-1} \alpha_k S_{t-1}(\rho_k - r_k)$$

which is a martingale $w.r.t. \ P^*$. Denote by $\mathcal{F}_t, T$ the finite set of stopping times taking values in $\{t, t+1, \ldots, T\}$. A callable contingent claim is a contract between an issuer $I$ and an investor $II$ addressing the asset with a maturity $T$. The issuer can choose a stopping time $\sigma$ to call back the claim with the payoff function $Y_\sigma$ and the investor can also choose a stopping time $\tau$ to exercise his/her right with the payoff function $X_\tau$ at any time before the maturity. Should neither of them stop before the maturity, the payoff should be $Z_t$. The payoff always goes from the issuer to the investor. We assume

$$0 \leq X_t \leq Z_t \leq Y_t, \ 0 \leq t < T$$

and

$$X_T = Z_T \quad (5)$$

The investor wishes to exercise the right so as to maximize the expected payoff. On the other hand, the issuer wants to call the contract so as to minimize the payment to the investor. Then, for any pair of the stopping times $(\sigma, \tau)$, define the payoff function by

$$R(\sigma, \tau) = Y_{\sigma} 1_{\{\sigma < \tau \leq T\}} + X_{\tau} 1_{\{\tau < \sigma \leq T\}} + Z_T 1_{\{\sigma \land \tau \leq T\}} \quad (6)$$

A hedge against a callable CC with a maturity $T$ is a pair $(\sigma, \pi)$ of a stopping time $\sigma$ and a self-financing investment strategy $\pi$ such that

$$W_{\sigma \land \tau}^\pi \geq R(\sigma, \tau), \ t = 0, 1, \cdots, T.$$ 

The price $v^*$ of a callable CC is the infimum of $v \geq 0$ such that there exists a hedge $(\sigma, \pi)$ against this callable CC with $W_{\sigma}^\pi = v$.

**Theorem 1 (Kifer [7]).** Let $P^* = \Pi^T \{p^*_t, 1 - p^*_t\}$ be the probability on the space $\Omega$ with $p^*_t = \frac{1-e^{-d_t}}{e^{-d_t}}$, $t \leq T < \infty$, and $E^*$ be the expectation with respect to $P^*$. Then, the price $v^*$ of the callable CC equals $v^*_{0,T}$ which can be obtained from the recursive equations as follows:

$$v^*_{T,T} = \Pi^T_{k=1} (1 + r_k)^{-1} Z_T$$

and

$$v^*_{t,T} = \min \{\Pi^T_{k=1} (1 + r_k)^{-1} Y_t, \ \max [\Pi^T_{k=1} (1 + r_k)^{-1} X_t, E^*(v^*_{t+1,T})]\} \quad (7)$$

Moreover, for $t = 0, 1, \cdots, T$

$$v^*_{t,T} = \min_{\sigma \in \mathcal{F}_t, T} \max_{\tau \in \mathcal{F}_t, T} E^* [\Pi^T_{k=1} (1 + r_k)^{-1} R(\sigma, \tau) | \mathcal{F}_t]$$

$$= \max_{\tau \in \mathcal{F}_t, T} \min_{\sigma \in \mathcal{F}_t, T} E^* [\Pi^T_{k=1} (1 + r_k)^{-1} R(\sigma, \tau) | \mathcal{F}_t]. \quad (8)$$

Furthermore, for each $t = 0, 1, \cdots, T$, the stopping times

$$\sigma^*_{t,T} = \min \{k \geq t | \Pi^T_{k=1} (1 + r_k)^{-1} Y_k \leq v^*_{t,T}\} \quad (9)$$
and
\[ \tau_{*,T} = \min\{k \geq t | \Pi_{k=1}^{T} (1 + r_k)^{-1} X_k \geq v_{k,T}^* \} \] (10)
belong to \( \mathcal{J}_{t,T} \) and satisfies inequalities
\[ E^* [\Pi_{k=1}^{\tau_{*,T} \wedge \tau} (1 + r_k)^{-1} R(\sigma_{*,T}^*, \tau) | \mathcal{S}_t] \leq v_{*,T} \]
\[ \leq E^* [\Pi_{k=1}^{\tau_{*,T} \wedge \tau} (1 + r_k)^{-1} R(\sigma, \tau_{*,T}) | \mathcal{S}_t] \] (11)
for any \( \sigma, \tau \in \mathcal{J} \) and \( v_{*,T} = \Pi_{k=1}^{T} (1 + r_k)^{-1} Z_T \).

**Remark 1.**
The model can be extended to the infinite case \( T \to \infty \), provided that \( r_k = r \) for all \( k \) and
\[ \lim_{T \to \infty} (1 + r)^{-T} Y_T = 0 \quad \text{with} \quad v_{T,T} = Z_T \] (12)
with \( P^* \)-probability 1. If \( Y_t = (K - S_t)^+ + \delta_t \), then equation (12) can be replaced by
\[ \lim_{T \to \infty} (1 + r)^{-T} \delta_T = 0 \] (13)
which means that the penalty does not grow too fast as \( t \to \infty \).
For example, let \( r_t = r \) and \( \delta_t = (1 + \gamma)^t \delta \) and then it follows that
\[ \lim_{T \to \infty} \left( \frac{1 + \gamma}{1 + r} \right)^T \delta = 0 \quad \text{for} \quad \gamma < r. \]

**Remark 2.**
Defining \( \tilde{W} \pi_T = \Pi_{k=1}^{T} (1 + r_k)^{-1} W^\pi_T \), then we obtain
\[ \tilde{W}^\pi_T = w + \sum_{k=1}^{T} \Pi_{k=1}^{T} (1 + r_k)^{-1} \alpha_k S_{k-1} (\rho_k - r_k) \] (14)
which is a martingale w.r.t. \( P^* = \{ p^*, 1 - p^* \}^T \).

**Corollary 1.**
Assume that \( r_k = r \) for \( k = 1, 2, \cdots \), and equation (12) holds. Then, the limit value
\[ v^* = \lim_{T \to \infty} v_{0,T}^* \] (15)
exists.

## 3 Optimal Policies in the Random Walk Case

In this section we propose a different approach from Kifer [7] and Dynkin [4]. The asset price follows as \( S_{t+1} = S_t Z_{t+1} = S_0 \cdot Z^1 \cdots Z^t \) where \( Z' \) are i.i.d. positive random variables with the probability distribution \( F(\cdot) \). Computations are much easy in the case of random walk. Since the asset price process follows a random walk, the payoff processes of \( X_t \) and \( Y_t \) are both Markov types. So we formulate this optimal stopping problem as a Markov decision process. In this section, we assume \( r_k = r \) for all \( k \) and put \( \beta = (1 + r)^{-1} \).
Let $X_t = \beta_t X(S_t)$, $Y_t = \beta_t Y(S_t)$ and $Z_t = \beta_t Z(S_t)$. It follows from these new notations that $\prod_{k=1}^{t}(1+r_k)^{-1}X_t = \beta_t \prod_{k=1}^{t}(1+r_k)^{-1}X_0$ and $\prod_{k=1}^{T}(1+r_k)^{-1}Y_t = \beta_T \prod_{k=1}^{T}(1+r_k)^{-1}Y_0$ and $\prod_{k=1}^{T}(1+r_k)^{-1}Z_t = \beta_T Z(S_T)$.

Taking times backward, put $v^1(t) = Z(t)$ and define for $n \geq 1$

$$v^{n+1}(s) \equiv (\mathcal{U} v^n)(s) \equiv \min(Y(s), \max(X(s), \beta_t E_s[v^n(sZ^1)]))$$

(16)

where $E_s$ is the conditional expectation with respect to $S_n = s$

Let $V$ be the set of all bounded measurable functions with the norm $\|v\| = \sup_{s \in (0, \infty)}|v(s)|$.

For $u, v \in V$ we write $u \leq v$ if $u(s) \leq v(s)$ for all $s \in (0, \infty)$. A mapping $\mathcal{U}$ is called a contraction mapping if

$$\|\mathcal{U} u - \mathcal{U} v\| \leq \beta \|u - v\|$$

for some $\beta < 1$ and for all $u, v \in V$.

**Lemma 1.**

The mapping $\mathcal{U}$ as defined by equation (16) is a contraction mapping.

**Proof.** For any $u, v \in V$ we have

$$(\mathcal{U} u)(s) - (\mathcal{U} v)(s) = \min(Y(s), \max(X(s), \beta_t E_s[u(sZ^1)])) - \min(Y(s), \max(X(s), \beta_t E_s[v(sZ^1)])) \leq \min(Y(s), \beta_t E_s[u(sZ^1)]) - \beta E_s[v(sZ^1)] \leq \beta E_s[u(sZ^1)] - \beta E_s[v(sZ^1)] \leq \beta E_s[\sup(u(sZ^1) - v(sZ^1))] = \beta \|u - v\|$$

Hence, we obtain

$$\sup_{s \in \Omega} (\mathcal{U} u)(s) - (\mathcal{U} v)(s) \leq \beta \|u - v\|. \quad (17)$$

By taking the roles of $u$ and $v$ reversely, we have

$$\sup_{s \in \Omega} (\mathcal{U} v)(s) - (\mathcal{U} u)(s) \leq \beta \|v - u\|. \quad (18)$$

Putting equation (17) and (18) together we obtain

$$\|\mathcal{U} u - \mathcal{U} v\| \leq \beta \|u - v\|. \quad \square$$

**Corollary 2.**

There exists a unique function $v \in V$ such that

$$(\mathcal{U} v)(s) = v(s) \quad \text{for all } s. \quad (19)$$
Furthermore, for all \( u \in V \)
\[
(U^T u)(s) \to v(s) \text{ as } T \to \infty
\]
where \( v(s) \) is equal to the fixed point defined by equation (19), that is, \( v(s) \) is a unique solution to
\[
v(s) = \min \{ Y(s), \max(X(s), \beta E_s[v(sZ^1)]) \}.
\]

Since \( U \) is a contraction mapping from corollary 1, the optimal value function \( v \) for the perpetual contingent claim can be obtained as the limit by successively applying an operator \( U \) to any initial value function \( v \) for a finite lived contingent claim.

**Remark 3.**
When we specialize the price process into the binominal process, the probability space can be reduced to \( \mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, \cdots \} \) with a \( \sigma \)-field \( \mathcal{S} \) generated by the number of up-jumps by time \( t \) and \( P = (p, 1 - p) \)

**Remark 4.**
If \( v(s) \) is monotone in \( s \), then \( E_s v(sZ^1) \) is monotone in \( s > 0 \).

**Lemma 2.**
Suppose that \( v(s) \) is monotone in \( s \). Then,

i) \( (U^n v)(s) \) is monotone in \( s \) for \( v \in V \).

ii) \( v \) satisfying \( v = U v \) is monotone in \( s \).

iii) there exists a pair \( (s^*_n, s^{**}_n) \), \( s^*_n < s^{**}_n \) of the optimal boundaries such that
\[
v^{n+1}(s) \equiv (U^n v)(s) = \begin{cases} 
Y(s) & \text{if } s^*_n \leq s \\
\beta E_s[v^n(sZ^1)] & \text{if } s^*_n < s < s^{**}_n, n = 1, 2, \cdots, T \\
X(s) & \text{if } s \leq s^{**}_n
\end{cases}
\]

with \( v^1 = Z_T \).

**Proof.** i) The proof follows by induction on \( n \). Suppose that \( X(s), Y(s) \) and \( Z(s) \) is monotone in \( s \). For \( n = 1 \), we have
\[
(U v^1)(s) = \min \{ Y(s), \max(X(s), \beta E_s[Z_T(sZ^1)]) \}
\]
which is monotone in \( s \). Suppose that \( v_n \) is monotone for \( n > 1 \). Then,
\[
v^{n+1}(s) \equiv (U^n v)(s) = \min \{ Y(s), \max(X(s), \beta E_s[v^n(sZ^1)]) \}
\]
which is again monotone in \( s \) since the maximum of the monotone functions is monotone.

ii) Since \( \lim_{n \to \infty} (U^n v)(s) \) point-wisely converges to the limit \( v(s) \) from corollary 2, the limit function \( v(s) \) is also monotone in \( s \).

iii) Should \( v^p = (U^{n-1} v)(s) \) be monotone in \( s \), then there exists at least one pair of boundary values \( s^*_n \) and \( s^{**}_n \) such that
\[
v^n = \begin{cases} 
Y(s) & \text{if } s \geq s^*_n \\
\max[X(s), \beta E_s(v^{n-1}(sZ^1))] & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]
and

\[
\max(X(s), \beta E_s[v^{n-1}(sZ^1)]) = \begin{cases} 
X(s) & \text{for } s \leq s^* \\
\beta E_s[v^{n-1}(sZ^1)] & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

From equation (11), \(v^n\) is monotone increasing in \(n\) since \(X_n(s) \leq v^n(s) \leq Y_n(s)\). Define for the issuer

\[
S^d_n = \{ s | v^n(s) = Y(s) \} \quad (20)
\]

\[
s^*_n = \inf\{ s | s \in S^d_n \}
\]

and for the investor

\[
S^u_n = \{ s | v^n(s) = X(s) \} \quad (22)
\]

\[
s^{**}_n = \inf\{ s | s \in S^u_n \}
\]

It is easy to show that

\[
s^*_n \geq s^{**}_n \text{ for each } n \quad (24)
\]

**Remark 5.**

In game put options (Kifer [7], Kyprianou [9]) it is assumed that \(X_n(S_n) = \beta^n X(S_n)\) and \(Y_n(S_n) = \beta^n (X(S_n) + \delta)\) with \(\delta > 0\) where \(X(S_n) = (K - S_n)^+\). It is easy to show that \(v^n = v^n(s)\) is continuous and decreasing in \(s\) and increasing in \(\delta\).

### 4 A Simple Callable Option

Suppose that the process \(\{S_t, t = 1, 2, \cdots\}\) is a random walk, that is,

\[S_{t+1} = S_t \cdot Z^{t+1}\]

where \(Z^1, Z^2, \ldots\) are independently distributed positive random variables with the finite mean \(\mu\) and with the distribution \(F(\cdot)\). Note that \(E^*(Z^{t+1}) = 1\) for all \(t\) under the risk neutral probability \(P^*\).

**Case (i) Callable Call Option**

We consider the case of a callable call option where \(X(s) = (s - K)^+\) and \(Y(s) = X(s) + \delta, \delta > 0\),

\[
\beta E^*_s(sZ^1) = \beta s(1 + p^* \mu + (1 - p^*)d) = \beta (1 + r)s = s
\]

which is a martingale. So \(\beta^n X(S_n) = \max(\beta^n S - \beta^n K, 0)\) is a submartingale. Applying the Optional Sampling Theorem, we obtain that

\[
v^f(s) = \min_{\sigma \in J, \tau \in J, \sigma < \tau} \max_{f \in J, \tau} E^*_f[\beta^{\sigma \wedge \tau} R(\sigma, \tau)]
\]

\[
= \min_{\sigma \in J, \tau \in J, \sigma < \tau} \max_{f \in J, \tau} E^*_f[\beta^{\sigma \wedge \tau} Y(S_{\sigma \wedge \tau})1_{\{\sigma < \tau\}} + X(S_{\sigma \wedge \tau})1_{\{\tau < \sigma\}} + Z_T 1_{\{\sigma \wedge \tau = T\}}]
\]

\[
= \min_{\sigma \in J, \tau \in J} E^*_f[\beta^{\sigma} Y(S_{\sigma})1_{\{\sigma < \tau\}} + \beta^T Z_T 1_{\{\sigma = T\}}]
\]

which can be represented in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.
Callable call options with the maturity $T < \infty$ can be degenerated into callable Europeans.

This corollary corresponds to the well known result that American call options are identical to the corresponding European call options. In the case of callable-putable call claims it follows that it is optimal for the investor not to exercise his/her putable right before the maturity. However, the issuer should choose an optimal call stopping time so as to minimize the expected payoff function given by equation (25). From equation (11) we know that
\[ X_t \leq v_t \leq Y_t \quad \text{for } 0 \leq t \leq T. \]
and the optimal stopping times for each $t = 0, 1, \cdots, T$ are
\[ \sigma_t^* = \min\{n \geq t : v^n(s) = Y_t(s)\} \wedge T \]
and
\[ \tau_t^* = \{n \geq t : v^n(s) = X_n(s)\}. \]

Lemma 3.
$\nu_t(s) - s$ is decreasing in $s$ for each $t$ and decreasing in $t$ for each $s$.

Proof. It is sufficient to prove for the case of $s > K$. The proof is again by induction on $v$. For $n = 1$
\[ \nu^1(s) - s = \max(s-K,0) - s \]
which is decreasing in $s$. Assume that $\nu^n(s) - s$ is decreasing in $s$. Then, for $n + 1$ we have
\[ \nu^{n+1}(s) - s = \min\{(s-K)^+ + \delta, \max[(s-K)^+, E^\nu(s\tilde{Z}^n)]\} - s \]
By the induction assumption for $n$, $\nu^n(sz) - sz$ is decreasing in $s$ for each $z > 0$. 

Case (ii) Callable Put Option
We consider the case of a callable put option where $X(s) = \max\{K-s,0\}$ and $Y(t) = X(t) + \delta$

Lemma 4.
Let $X(s) = \max\{K-s,0\}$ and $Y(s) = X(s) + \delta$. $\nu^n(s) + s$ is increasing in $s$ for each $t$.

Proof. It is sufficient to prove for the case of $K > s$. For $n = 1$ we have
\[ \nu^1(s) + s = \max\{K-s,0\} + s = \max\{K,s\} \]
which is increasing in \( s \). Suppose the assertion for \( n \).

Then, putting \( \mu = E(\tilde{Z}_n) = 1 \), we have

\[
v_{n+1}(s) + s = \min\{ (K - s)^+ + \delta, \max\{ (K - s)^+, \beta E_{s}v_n(s\tilde{Z}) + s\tilde{Z} \} \} = \min\{ K + \delta, \max[K, \beta E_{s}(v_n(s\tilde{Z}) + s\tilde{Z})] \}
\]

\( V_{n+1}(s\tilde{S}) + s\tilde{S} \) is increasing in \( s \) for all \( \tilde{S} > 0 \). So is \( v_n(s) + s \).

For each \( n \), define

\[
s_n^I = \inf\{ s : v_n(s) + s \geq K + \delta \}
\]

\[
s_n^II = \inf\{ s : v_n(s) + s \geq K \}
\]

where \( s_n^I \) and \( s_n^II \) equal \( \infty \) when these sets are empty.

**Lemma 5.**

\( s_n^I \) and \( s_n^II \) are increasing in \( n \).

**Lemma 6.**

If \( \frac{1}{\tilde{S}} F\left( \frac{\tilde{X}}{\tilde{S}} \right) > 1 - \int_{\tilde{S}}^{\infty} xF(x) \), it is never optimal for the investor to exercise before the maturity. It is never optimal for the issuer to call at the maturity.

**Theorem 2.**

i) There exists an optimal call policy for the issuer as follows:

If the asset price is \( s \) at time \( n \) and \( s > s_n^I \), then the issuer call the contingent claim.

ii) There exists an optimal exercise policy for the investor as follows:

If the asset price is \( s \) at time \( t \) and \( s \leq s_n^II \), the investor exercises the contingent claim, otherwise, either of them do not exercise.

Since \( X \leq v_{n,T} \leq Y \), for each \( n \leq T \), the issuer should stop or call if \( s \in S_n^I \) and the investor should exercise if \( s \in S_n^II \).

**Lemma 7.**

\[
C_n^I \supset C_{n+1}^I, \quad C_n^II \subset C_{n+1}^II
\]

\[
C_n^I \subset C_n^I \quad \text{and} \quad C_n^II \supset C_{n+1}^II
\]

The proof directly follows from the result that \( v_{n,T} \) is increasing in \( n \).

## 5 Concluding Remarks

In this paper we consider the discrete time valuation model for callable contingent claims in which the asset price follows a random walk including a binominal process as a special case. It is shown that such valuation model can be formulated as a coupled optimal stopping problem of a two person game between the issuer and the investor. We show under some assumptions that these exists a simple optimal call policy for the issuer
and optimal exercise policy for the investor which can be described by the control limit values. Also, we investigate analytical properties of such optimal stopping rules for the issuer and the investor, respectively, possessing a monotone property.

It is of interest to extend it to the three person games among the issuer, investor and the third party like stake holders. Furthermore, we might analyze a dynamic version of the model by introducing the state of the economy which follows a Markov chain. In this extended dynamic version the optimal stopping rules as well as their value functions should depend on the state of the economy. We shall discuss such a dynamic valuation model somewhere be in a near future.

Acknowledgements

This paper was supported in part by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 20241037) of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science in 2008-2012.

References